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TRUTH, DISCOURSE, AND REALITY 
BY 
GEORGE P. ADAMS 
Within the context of the present discussion, the adjective 
"true" qualifies only such entities as beliefs, judgments, and 
propositions. Accordingly, it would appear that two major 
questions confront us. First, what is the nature of any entity 
which may be qualified by the adjective ''true,'' and secondly, 
under what circumstances does it acquire this predicate. It is 
as if we wanted to know the meaning of such a class of things 
as "books belonging to me." "Belonging to me" is a predicate 
of some books. We should have to know the nature of books at 
large, irrespective of their belonging to me or not, and then we 
should have to ascertain the nature of the new quality which 
some books acquire when they become mine. lVIost of the books 
in the world are not books belonging to me, and likewise most 
of the assertions and propositions which exist seem not to be 
true. I shall hope to show, before I finish, that this is not a 
very satisfactory or adequate sort of analogy and that it rests 
upon assumptions which are questionable. But for the presE;)nt, 
I want to accept the framework which such an analogy suggests 
and see what we can make of it. 
, I begin then with the observation that truth is a quality 
which may attach only to entities of a certain kind, and which 
does not belong to them intrinsically and by their own right, 
so that it is not the case that to be an entity of the sort in 
question is also to possess the quality of being true. The full-
fledged existence of these entities contains or implies no guar-
anty of their being true. They are to be thought of as capable 
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of existing, of living their own life and fulfilling their own 
careers irrespective of whether they acquire the additional 
quality of being true or not. Their existence as entities or events 
of a certain kind is one thing; their happening to be true ( or 
false) is incidental and adventitious to their existence. The 
entities here in question are beliefs, judgments, assertions, or 
propositions. We are, for the present, to think of these as exist-
ing in some domain which can be marked off from all other 
regions, and designated as the region in which these entities, as 
existing, have their habitat, just as the flora and fauna of Aus-
tralia have their existence within the spatial confines of that 
continent, or as the passengers of an ocean liner, as long as they 
are passengers, dwell in and on the ship. Where do beliefs and 
assertions exist and carry on 1 The usual answer is, I suppose, 
within men's minds. 
But this answer is not satisfactory or illuminating, not yet 
at least. For what do we know about the mind as a realm or 
a potential container or beliefs and propositions, ready to enter-
tain or make judgments and assertions, but hav:ing an existence 
and nature different from that which belongs to the entities 
which exist within it-a kind of Noah's Ark before the animals 
went in 1 We have framed our question clumsily if it leads 
to such an answer. The only clews we can have as to the nature 
and existence of minds are to be gathered from beliefs and 
judgments themselves, and other entities which do not here con-
cern us.· We have no knowledge of minds apart from or prior 
to these entities themselves. Yet judgments and assertions cer-
tainly exist, and they exist somewhere. We need a term to 
designate the realm wherein they dwell. I think the best term 
to use for this purpose is ''discourse.'' I shall, in any case, use 
this term to denote the realm, matrix, or medium in which judg-
ments and propositions exist. Beliefs too belong here, so soon 
as they become articulate, so soon, that is, as there is something 
believed which is expressed in words or symbols of some sort. 
Prior to such articulation of experience, say as mere feeling, 
belief does not concern us. Discourse then, as something which 
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we know and use, is the scene and setting of judgments and 
assertions, whether true or false. If a judgment, having its home 
in the realm of discourse, acquires the quality true, then truth 
too belongs to discourse, and exists there. There too will falsity 
exist, in so far as a proposition which acquires the predicate 
"false" is made and exists in the world of discourse. "Dis-
course'' need be so far only a collective or distributive term, 
designating the totality of expressed beliefs and judgments, 
some of which are false and some of which may be true. Yet 
even so, there seems to be something substantive and existential 
about discourse, even if it be no self-contained matrix, even if 
it be nothing but the totality of assertions which are at any time 
made . .Assertions and propositions are made of something, and 
we can use the term broadly as a name either for the material 
out of which they are formed or for the formed and shaped 
product. 
The central issues concerning propositions and judgments 
are born from the necessity of making certain distinctions and 
also from the equally imperious need of discovering and defining 
the bonds and relations which link together the discriminated 
aspects. It is usually easier, both in practical affairs and in 
philosophy, to pull things apart than to put them together again. 
I want to exhibit three distinguishable aspects in any situation 
where beliefs, judgments and propositions are involved. In the 
first place, they exist as events which happen, which occur at 
some region of space and time. .Assertions are existing here and 
now. I am making and uttering them. You are hearing them. 
There are specific events in my body-mind and in your body-
minds, and in the intervening medium. What the specific nature 
of .these events may be, what are the respective shares and 
boundaries of physics, physiology, and psychology in their 
description and explanation, need not here concern us. Some-
thing surely happens when a belief is held and expressed, when 
a proposition or judgment is made. These exist as events some-
where and somewhen, just as surely as do thunderstorms and 
earthquakes. .A.nd like other events occurring in nature, they 
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have causes and effects, they are caught up in a moving network 
of other events which precede, surround, and follow them. 
Every judgment, then, exists as an event or a series of events 
. ' 
and q1w, event, it is no different from the occurrences and hap-
penings which are studied in physics, geology, or meteorology. 
But there is certainly a second aspect, ingredient, or domain 
wherever any event such as judgment or belief occurs. Wher-
ever a belief occurs as an event there is something which is 
believed. When an assertion is made and exists, there is some-
thing asserted. Let us call this aspect or entity the content or 
the immanent object of the judgment. Every assertion which 
is more than a series of sounds, has such a content or immanent 
object. Both the term "content' i and the term "object" are 
ambiguous and possibly misleading. In saying that an assertion 
has a content, I do not mean to denote any character or quality 
of the assertion as an event. The content of an assertion is not 
a character belonging to the assertion as an event-its length, 
for instance, in the sense in which a sound of a definite intensity, 
timbre, and duration is a content of a thunderclap. To describe 
what the thunderstorm is, qua, event, is ipso facto to describe 
that ingredient of the thunderstorm which is the sound. To 
describe an assertion as an event is likewise to describe the 
qualities of the sounds of which the assertion is composed. Nqne 
of the contents or characters or the assertion as an event, as a 
series of occurring sounds, is the thing asserted, the assertum. 
Thunderstorms and rainbows do not say or assert anything. 
They just happen. But the assertions that Napoleon escaped 
from Elba, and that the moon is made of green cheese both 
happen-their happening is really qualified in ways which the 
biologist, physicist, and psychologist may discover-and they 
also say something. Suppose a Chinaman makes a statement in 
Chinese. I could explore and describe his assertion as an event, 
discover all of its existing qualities, its antecedents, and conse-
quences and be in complete ignorance of what it is that he is 
saying. The only difference between doing this and describing a 
thunderstorm is that I may suppose the Chinaman's noises to 
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assert something, whereas I make no such supposition in listen-
ing to a thunderclap. 'rhat content of the assertion, which is 
the assertum, is not any quality or character of the assertion 
as an existing event. 
The designation of that which is asserted as the object of the 
assertion may be equally ambiguous. We are seemingly com-
pelled to distinguish between such objects as are believed in, 
asserted, described, and judged, and another level or dimension 
of objects which exist in their own right, objects which are 
transcendent to the judgment rather than the objects asserted 
by the judgment. The central crux of the problem of truth lies 
just here and will soon occupy the whole of our attention. For 
the present, I ask you to observe merely that every assertion 
has a more immediate object which is simply the fact or object 
asserted. I call it the immanent object of the judgment. 
The immanent object of a belief, judgment, or assertion is 
always more or other than a simple atomic entity. Some relation 
or relational complex is present in anything which is asserted 
or judged. I never believe, assert, or judge a single quality, 
whether essence or existence. I believe something about- that 
quality or I believe that it exists in some context. If I assert 
that Napoleon escaped from Elba, I am not asserting Napoleon 
nor Elba, nor escaping. If I assert that Napoleon was or existed, 
not Napoleon alone is the immanent object of my assertion but 
some domain of existence within which I place Napoleon. 
The objective which is asserted or believed must certainly 
be distinguished from any event which is the believing or assert-
ing it. Indeed, the objective appears to be, with respect to those 
events, transcendent. My judgment today that Napoleon escaped 
from Elba, as a mental or bodily event is as distinct from the 
judgment made fifty years ago by a French schoolboy, as my 
eating my breakfast this morning is distinct from his eating 
his breakfast on a certain clay half a century ago. Yet these 
judgment-events, existentially so discrete and dissimilar have 
the same or an essentially similar content or objective. And the 
totally dissimilar events which might constitute the gesticula-
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tions of a deaf mute could still have the same objective. Innu-
merably different and discrete events, o~ the sort that we 
designate as asserting, believing, judging, etc., scattered about 
in different places and times can have one and the same iinma-
nant object or objective. They can all express the same 
proposition. It is not at all that they all have a common nature 
or quality, as many different roses may have the character 
"pink." The identity of content of different assertions ( where 
content=immanent object) has nothing to do with the identity 
of a single character belonging to different things or events. 
It is not only beliefs and assertions which have an immanent 
object. Desire and aversion, sentiments and attitudes, liking 
and disliking, feeling, sensing and perceiving, all of the tradi-
tional modes of conscious experience have immanent objects. 
Desire implies and includes something which is desired, and so 
for all the rest. But it is only modes of conscious experience 
which have such immanent objects. Lamps and chairs, thun-
derstorms and earthquakes are events which occur, specified and 
qualified each in its own way, having causes and effects, standing 
in all sorts of relational contexts except that one relation in 
which the event which is a judgment stands to the content which 
is judged. This seems to me as indubitable and basic as anything 
can well be, and to define the one single difference between a 
mental event and all other events. 
Yet in spite of this difference between the assertion as an 
event and the assertum, in spite of the fact that the ,assertum 
is neither a:ri.y character of the judgment-event nor the occur-
rence of that event, it is none the less immanent. This is so 
because you need only to inspect and to understand the judg-
ment or assertion in order to know exactly what it is that is 
judged or asserted. The assertion itself tells you. This is why 
I have spoken of the object of the judgment as a content and as 
immanent. In order to know what is believed or asserted in 
any instance yo{1 need never, it would seem, go beyond the 
boundaries of that form of human experience which we have 
called discourse. All that discourse says, what is asserted in 
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any judgment, seems cabined and confined within the realm of 
articulate discourse. If I ask what it is that you assert when 
you say that twice three is six, that the Alps were submerged 
in the mesozoic period, do I journey outside the realm of dis-
course, into the empyrean of timeless essences, or back in time 
to a remote geological epoch before there was any judgment 
and any discoursd How impossible and absurd! I stay close at 
home; I know all that you assert when I understand the content 
of your judgment here and now. I scrutinize and comprehend 
it without once leaving the realm of discourse. 
But, that object of _a judgment which can be discovered and 
inspected without going beyond the judgment itself, the content 
or immanent object, surely is not the object, the "real" object, 
that about which we want to know and judge, belonging to that 
world which science, history, and philosophy seek to reveal to 
us. How absurd to tell me that the object which I am describing 
and telling about in any judgment will be found by looking 
within discourse at the judgment or description itself. When I 
exclaim, '' who is. it that I see here?'' a bystander who hears 
my exclamation does not look at me or into my eyes, save per-
haps only to know the direction from which _some one is• coming, 
but at the approaching person. What exists and lives within 
discourse (including aU its contents or immanent objects) seems 
to be related to a domain of transcendent things and events, as 
account books, with their notations and figured sums are related 
to actual piles of real money existing not in account books, but 
in pocket-books and banks. When my accounts are audited, the 
auditor examines the notations in my account book and then 
looks outside of my books to see what money I actually have 
on hand. Certain theories of knowledge seem to me to be 
analogous to an injunction to an auditor of my accounts to tell 
me whether they are correct but forbidding him ever to inquire 
what money I really have or owe. 
The auditor of my accounts has no difficulty in turning 
away from my books, looking at the money in my pocket-book, 
and seeing whether or no they correspond. This is the way in 
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which, at the end, he verifies the truth or correctness of my 
accounts. He compares the figured sum and the real sum, the 
immanent and the transcendent money. Similarly, the truth of 
a judgment ought to depend upon an analogous correspondence 
between that which is believed, judged, and asserted in dis-
course, and the real transcendent object which exists outside 
the realm of discourse. 
We have before us the familiar framework of a correspon-
dence theory of truth. We have reached it by way of distin-
guishing between the immanent object of any assertion which 
can be known by an inspection and understanding of the 
assertion itself, without leaving the realm of discourse at all, 
and the "real," transcendent object about which the assertion 
with all its immanent content is made. I know the entire imma-
nent object of the judgment, Napoleon escaped from Elba, when 
I understand the proposition. But no inspection or understand-
ing of it will tell me anything about its truth. To know whether 
the judgment is true or not, I must turn away from that which 
is asserted im, the judgment, to the real Napoleon and his real 
adventure of escape from the real Elba, which are not contents 
or constituents of the judgment at all. Unless these existed in 
their own right and in just the way in which they are depicted 
in the judgment long before my judgment with all its content 
and its immanent object came into being, my judgment is not 
true. 
The situation on our hands then is this. We make judgments 
and assertions. These occur as events in our body-minds. Their 
existence as events is limited to highly organized animal bodies. 
But these events, unlike all other events, sustain a unique rela-
tion to something which is objective to them, i.e., the proposition, 
the assertum. Nevertheless, this objective content of the asser-
tion is immanent because, in order to discover it, you need only 
to inspect and to understand the assertion itself. So far, you 
attend to nothing which transcends the boundaries of discourse. 
This content or immanent object is not any character or quality 
of the judgment as an occurring event, nor is it related to that 
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event as cause or effect. But, no such inspection or understand-
ing of what is asserted will yield any hint of the truth or falsity 
of the judgment. The truth of a judgment or belief appears 
to depend wholly upon the existence of a real object which falls 
outside the domain of discourse. A judgment is true in case 
there really exists a transcendent object which corresponds with 
the immanent object asserted in and by the judgment. But no 
scrutiny however exhaustive of the judgment and of what it 
asserts, its content, can possibly decide whether or not such a 
transcendent object exists. To suppose that it could, would be 
equivalent to saying that yon could by ascertaining what it 
means to be a book, tell which books have in addition the prop-
erty of being my books. But just as the property of being a 
book of mine is accidental and adventitious to the nature of 
being a book, so the property of being true is external and 
adventitious to all of the internal characteristics of judgment. 
The correspondence theory of truth is thus the result of 
erecting the domain of discourse, with its occurring events and 
their immanent objects, into a self-contained realm, an island 
or prison within whose corr.fines we live and move. All science 
and all knowledge dwell here in the realm of discourse. Yet the 
figure of a prison is not very apt. This realm of discourse, 
self-contained as it is ( on the theory of correspondence) is in 
one sense, spacious enough, perhaps infinitely so. It is "self-
contained" only because all existing, real, and transcendent 
objects lie outside of it. They must do so in order to provide any 
possibility for a judgment to be true. The truth of a judgment 
never depends upon nor is it ascertainable by discovering any-
thing whatever which is found within the judgment. What 
judgments are true depends entirely upon what is real, not 
upon what is judged and asserted, what is literally grasped and 
held within the scope of discourse. When I say that this self-
enclosed realm of discourse though in one sense a prison is, in 
another sense, spacious and in:finite, I am thinking of all that 
inexhaustible realm, which is accessible to us through discourse 
alone. I am thinking of those essences which Mr. Santayana 
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once regarded as '' concretions in discourse.'' Whether we think 
of essences as constituted by discourse, or as simply discovered 
by discourse, is for our present purposes irrelevant. In either 
case, they are germane to discourse, they comprise its habitat; 
they provide the subsistential, dreamy stuff which is woven 
into the structures of ·mathematics and logic, dialectic and dis-
course, fancy and imagination-all of that infinitely profuse 
realm which, on the correspondence theory, is held aloof from 
existence, and from reality where this means that which really 
exists. Discourse moves at will throughout this realm. But the 
truth of what discourse discovers here-in the really pregnant 
sense of truth-does not depend upon anything found either in 
discourse or in essences, but upon the existence in reality of real 
facts, events, and structures. On these premises, the confines of 
discourse and essence, remote as they may be, are none the less 
there, and beyond them, irrelevant to anything found within 
those confines, is existence. 
The philosophical motives which lead to this conception of 
the realm of discourse as thus self-enclosed, separated from 
reality by all that distinguishes the immanent object of discourse 
and the transcendent object, such motives are both numerous 
and potent. Men have made and are still making and remaking 
science, but men have not made nature. The hypotheses and 
theories, the concepts and formulae of science have issued from 
human observation, experiment, and thought. They are just as 
much the product of men's mind, of human nature, as fairy tales 
and myths, and they rank as inventions no less than aeroplanes. 
These achievements and products of constructive human activity 
continue to exist and live in what we have been calling the realm 
of discourse. But we lose sight of essential characteristics of 
that invention which we name science and knowledge when we 
compare it with physical inventions and tools. An aeroplane, 
once made, enters into the context of physical nature; it :flies 
through the air, and becomes a part of the spatio-temporal 
world of physical objects and events. It is not so with scientific 
judgments, statements, and formulae. 
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In building up a scientific hypothesis, the object of the 
scientist is not to take something from nature, refashion it, 
combine it with other things, and then to replace the artificial 
product back into nature. That is what he does when he 
invents an aeroplane. But the scientist is bent upon knowing 
what nature is without remaking or altering it one single bit. 
I cannot but think that the pragmatic emphasis upon experi-
ment, upon the fashioning of instruments and all of the 
elaborate practical laboratory activity of modern science, as 
being the very life of knowledge, leads to a distorted perspective. 
Experiment is purely instrumental. It is but the external means 
-as necessary as you please-for knowing, a knowing which 
is itself never practice. Hence, in making science, nature must 
be untouched and unaltered. How can this be· unless the knowl-
edge which men achieve exists somewhere apart from nature 
which is increate 1 I think that most of the really fundamental 
grounds for the correspondence theory of truth can be developed 
from this thesis that men make science but have not made 
nature. Since something is certainly and literally made_ when 
scientific knowledge is achieved, and since that something is not 
nature itself, are we not compelled to say that the knowledge 
which is the product of human observation and thought is a 
duplicate of nature, existing in a medium of its own different 
from th0t of nature and reality1 Nature is the model which we 
find and do not make; knowledge is the scheme or map, corres-
ponding to that model, which we construct in the medium of 
discourse. 
But, if we can thus be thought to build up in the medium 
of discourse, structures which correspond with the models which 
we find in nature and outside of discourse, we can also disregard 
any such model and contrive structures in discourse to which 
nothing real corresponds. We invent playfully, piecing together 
the counters of discourse, weaving whatever patterns our fancy 
may dictate. Discourse is plastic clay which a sculptor ma.y 
fashion into a form true to some model which he has before 
him, whose given shape constrains his creation. So the s9ientist 
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hopes to work in the medium of discourse with the facts of 
nature as his models, building up the structures of science to 
conform to that which he finds and does not make. But the 
soft, yielding clay may also evoke a sheer creative impulse. All 
given models may be disregarded. Fantastic figures are fash-
ioned, a thousand shapes emerge like grotesque gargoyles to 
which nothing real corresponds. So it is with discourse. It too 
seems to be a plastic medium which can be worked without the 
constraining influence of any external model, yielding structures 
grotesque and fanciful, beautiful and ugly, significant and 
absurd. Here is the home of error, of suppositions, of fancy, 
and imagination. Here too dwell logic and mathematics, com-
plex intricately woven concretions in discourse, whose fabrica-
tion is guided by no external model at all but solely by rules 
and principles which the creative thinker himself selects or 
determines. 
I think it is impossible to exaggerate the influence and the 
importance of the presuppositions which constitute the founda-
tion of such a philosophical perspective and framework. l\Iodern 
Empiricism from the time of Locke has moved within such a 
framework. The mind ( or an internal self-contained realm of 
discourse) is a region in which once something gets in, it 
expands, proliferates, develops or is shaped in such a ·way that 
what it eventually becomes bears no resemblance to wh~t it was 
initially. Once in the mind, or in discourse, ideas become sub-
ject only to the jurisdiction of the internal medium in which 
henceforth they are to fulfil their careers. Their life within the 
mind may be one of gTadual impoverishment, starvation, and 
decay. Images and thought are then said to be decaying sense, 
bare abstract skeletons which alone remain when the ·warmth 
and intimacy of original impressions and perceptions are left 
behind. Or on the other hand, the ideas which expand and com-
bine in discourse and in mind generate new structures and new 
meanings which far outstrip the poverty of initial impressions. 
But they do so only by relinquishing any claim to truth-i.e., 
to correspondence with those primitive elements which alone 
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disclose objective facts. The more of art and artifice which 
enters into their making, the more widely do they depart from 
the original simple elements which are given at the outset and 
which accordingly are more genuinely objective. It is as if I 
applied a lighted match to a piece of paper. There is a moment 
when the correspondence between the flame of the match and 
that of the paper is at a maximum. I do not say identity. I 
might say continuity. The spread of flame in the match is con-
tinuous with the spread of flame in the paper. But the match 
is made of wood and the news sheet is made of paper. The stuff 
of the paper provides a medium or matrix in which events, 
initiated by the flame of the match, something objective, will 
occur of a kind and on a scale to which nothing corresponds in 
the world beyond the boundaries of the paper. What corres-
pondence ( or continuity) may have existed at the outset is lost 
and left far behind as soon as the initial flame spreads and 
proliferates in the separable and detached medium of the paper. 
The anology is crude and no one would wish to press it too 
far. But it does picture a philosophical framework whose hold 
upon our traditional way of thinking, it would be very hard to 
exaggerate. The little flame which initially is both in the match 
and the paper is like the simple ideas of Locke or the impres-
sions of Hume, or like primary qualities shared alike by our 
minds and by things, or like lYir. Russell's percepts. The flame 
as it later exists in the paper alone is like complex ideas, or 
secondary <,Jualities, or the products of mere custom and imagina-
tion, ideal constructions of thought and discourse, which in their 
complexity and artificiality correspond to nothing objective. 
The correspondence theory of truth, ·with respect to judg-
ment, bears a close resemblance to the representative theory of 
perception. Thus, according to this theory, we are directly 
aware in perception, only of mental states. Likewise, the imma-
nent object or content of the judgment is, on the correspondence 
theory, all that the judgment itself in any way holds or contains. 
Conversely, for the representative theory of perception, we have 
no direct, sensory awareness of what is physically and inde-
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pendently real. Likewise, on the correspondence theory, the real 
object judged about is existentially transcendent to the asser-
tion, or content, disclosed by an inspection and understanding 
of the judgment as it lies within the realms of discourse. 
Again, on the premises of the representative theory of per-
ception, the perceived characters of "physical" objects cannot 
really be physical, independent, and real, because they depend 
on a context, and vary from one perceptual situation to another. 
But there can be only one set of characters-position, size, etc.,-
which intrinsically and absolutely belong to a physical object. 
Therefore, the perceived qualities which are relational cannot 
be physical and real. They are mental. There is, consequently, 
a much greater range of perception than of physical objects. 
A dish of water really is some one definite temperature. Some-
times it is felt as hot, sometimes as cold. Hence, the discrepancy 
between the felt temperatures and the real temperature, and 
since tney cannot both exist at the same time and place in the 
physical order, felt temperatures are mental. 
Likewise with judgment. Charles I either did or did not die 
in his bed. :But I can assert either the one or the other. Or I 
can even say that he was drowned at sea, or any one of count-
less things, only one of which would be true-i.e., that one whose 
immanent object, the assertion, corresponds with the real his-
toric fact. The range of possible judgments ( all but one of 
which are false) is analogous with the range of perce~ved 
qualities, only one of which bears any exact correspondence to 
the objective fact. The world of past history cannot contain a 
real Charles who was both beheaded, and who was drowned at 
sea. Yet some habitat must be provided for the Charles who is 
judged to have been drowned at sea. But you cannot so plaus-
ibly convert him into a mental state as you can ( on the repre-
sentative theory of perception) perceived, sensory qualities 
which conflict with the one real quality belonging to the real 
object. The Charles who is judged to have been drowned cer-
tainly is not a mental Charles; the immanent object of a 
judgment, even an erroneous judgment, is after all an object 
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and not any slab of the stream of consciousness of the mind 
which makes the judgment. Yet the Charles qualified as drowned 
certainly never existed in the historical past ; he is not the real 
Charles who dismissed the short Parliament. Where then does 
he exist? Where else but in a subsistent realm of essences, a 
kind of philosophical attic in which all sorts of discarded furni-
ture can be stuffed away for which there is no place in the 
downstairs world of really existing facts and events. .In other 
words, the existence and the possibility of false propositions 
compels us to posit a realm of subsistent objectives (in JYiei-
nong's sense) or essences, and to locate in that realm the 
immediate objects of such judgments, just as fluctuating and 
relational perceived qualities have to be taken out of the inde-
pendent, physical order and lodged in minds, because they so 
often conflict with the one intrinsic quality which can alone 
be real. On the one hand, subjective mental states, and on the 
other hand, essences which subsist but do not exist, provide a 
refuge for the discards and misfits of the actual. 
But, once embarked on such an enterprise, where sha,11 we 
stop, either in transferring perceived qualities into minds, or 
entities discoursed and judged about into the realm of non-
existing essences? JYir. JYiarhenke pointed out the difficulty with 
respect to perceived qualities. Not only some, but aU perceived 
qualities are relational; they vary with the state and position 
of the percipient organism, they depend upon the intervening 
medimn and upon the choice of standards of measurement 
wherewith to ascertain the alleged real qualities of things. Like-
wise, with judgment and its objects. If the assertum of a false 
proposition is but an objective inhabiting the domain of essences, 
so too is the assertum of a true proposition. .As long as we are 
judging, we never trespass beyond the boundaries of objects 
suitable to discourse, beyond the realm of essence. Judgment 
itself never can reveal the truth or falsity of a belief because 
the only entities which judgment knows are essences severed 
from existence. 
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If now any juagment happens to be true, if there happens 
to exist a real situation corresponding to the content of the 
judgment, that is an added and extrinsic fact, irrelevant to the 
existence and the meaning of the judgment itself. 
Such, then, are some of the analogies between the theory 
of representative perception and the correspondence theory of 
truth. This is not the place nor is there any need for me to 
examine the theory of representative 'perception and expose the 
grounds upon which it meets disaster. Mr. Marhenke has 
already done that, and I accept the validity both of his criti-
cism of that theory and of the general direction in which the 
positive theory of perception which he sets forth, is moving. I 
assent, that is, to the following three theses : 
1. In all perception, we are in direct cognitive contact with 
independent, physical existence. 
2 . .All perceived characters are relational; their nature is 
dependent upon the total context in which they exist. 
3. It follows that there are no physical -existences with sim-
ple, intrinsic qualities indissolubly attached to them in such 
wise that any perceived characters incompatible with these 
intrinsic qualities have to be placed in a mental and non-physical 
medium. 
If now we reject the theory of representative perception 
and accept some such theses as these with respect to the nature 
of perception, are we not all the more compelled to adhere to 
a correspondence theory of truth with respect to judgment f 
How otherwise shall we account for error and falsity f We have 
purged perception of error; we assert that, throughout, percep-
tion discloses directly and without the intermediary of mental 
duplicates, the existence of physical reality. Driven out of 
perception, where else but in judgment, interpretation, and 
inference, shall error be found f And if discourse is the only 
possible seat of error, will it not be because in discourse and 
judgment, we are directly concerned only with an immanent 
content, existentially divorced from real objects, sometimes per-
haps corresponding to them but frequently not? When I assert 
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that Nero was the last Roman emperor, my statement is simply 
and totally false, What it asserts is absolutely excluded from 
the historical past. In making this assertion I am not in any 
contact with reality at all. If perchance any of my judgments 
are true, I am in quite indirect cognitive contact with the real, 
ie., through the intermediary of the terms and essences which 
alone are directly accessible, I find it difficult and even impos-
sible to accept the substance and implications of such a theory 
as this, and I hope to show, in the remainder of my paper, some 
of the grounds for my dissent, and to offer a brief indication 
of the only possible direction in which, as I think, we can 
advance. 
In the first place-and paradoxical as it may well appear-
I deny that when I now utter the words "Nero was the last 
Roman emperor" I am making a bona fide judgment. This is, 
if you choose, a proposition, an artificial combination of words 
or terms. It is not a judgment because when I make it, I neither 
believe it, nor do I make any claim that it is true. Essential 
for a bona fide judgment is the claim to be true, to reach and to 
portray or embody some fact, event, or situation which is real. 
The proposition does indeed assert something; it has its own 
content and immanent object. This content is an artificial 
product of language, useful perhaps for purposes of make-
believe or for formal logic. It would be a judgment only if the 
content of the assertion claimed to coincide ( or if you prefer, 
to represent) a transcendent object. The crucial difficulty in 
interpreting the nature of erroneous judgments does not arise 
in the case of propositions which are known to be false, which 
are not believed in, and which consequently, I should say, are 
not genuine judgments. The problem is critical only where you 
have a bona fide judgment, one, that is, which claims to be true. 
Unless some sort of claim or venture is actually made and made 
in good faith, there is no possibility either of success or of 
defeat. 
·when I say that belief in its truth, and the claim to be true 
is an essential aspect of judgment, I do not mean merely to say, 
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with Mr. Russell, for instance, that a certain kind of feeling is 
present whenever a judgment is made and its truth is believed. 
Belief is dependent on something more than mere feeling. It 
is dependent on the presence of evidence of some kind and 
degree. A judgment is both the articulation and also the inter-
pretation of some present or presented evidence. In complete 
absence of any evidence no judgment can occur. A verbal propo-
sition of the sort "Nero was the last Roman emperor," or "the 
moon is made of green cheese'' is no real judgment precisely 
because, for us, there is no evidence to support these statements. 
Hence we are entitled from now on to consider only such 
instances of discourse as are (1) based upon some evidence, 
(2) carry consequently some degree of conviction and belief, 
and ( 3) make a claim to be true. But ·we meet here at once with 
difficulties. In so far as every judgment rests upon evidence, 
and in so far as a judgment is faithful to that evidence, are not 
aU judgments in so far true~ Have we not assimilated judg-
ment to perception~ We needed something different from per-
ception just because we accepted, in principle, the thesis that all 
perception is veridical, that independent existence is directly 
disclosed in perception. 
Let us see what we have. Men once believed that the earth 
was a flat, stationary disc surrounded by water. We now be-
lieve it to be spherical, to rotate, and to move in an elliptical 
orbit around the sun. Both of these assertions are genuine 
judgments, the one, say, made by Thales, the other by ourselves. 
Thales' assertion was a judgment and not merely a verbal propo-
sition not only because he brJlieved it and claimed truth for it, 
but because his belief rested upon such evidence as was then 
accessible to him. Our conflicting belief summarizes the evidence 
accessible to us. The principle of contradiction bids us say that 
if our judgment is true, that of Thales was wrong. The same 
earth cannot be both a flat stationary disc, and a moving, rotat-
ing sphere. All the ingredients of a correspondence theory of 
truth are here at hand. Nevertheless, I think we both can and 
must deal with sucli conflicting judgments as these, in the same 
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way in which we have to deal with sensory and perceptual dis-
crepancies. We could not do this if the earth which Thales 
asserted to be flat is the one identical and simple earth which 
we assert to be round. The earth of Thales was the earth com-
patible w~.th the evidence accessible to him, and that was a flat 
earth. Our round earth is the earth which is compatible and 
continuous with the totality of evidence accessible to us. In this 
sense the earth described by Thales is not the earth described 
by us. I say, '' in this sense.'' For observe, there is another 
sense in which they are the same. That is, both Thales and we 
believe that something designated as the earth does really exist. 
We differ as to the qualities and characters which we ascribe to 
the earth. And every one of the characters which Thales ascribed 
to the earth, in so far as it was supported by evidence, must be 
provided for and included within our description and intocpre-
tation of what the earth is. Thales' earth was just as really flat 
within the perspective of his evidence, as is ours round within 
the cqntext of our available evidence. 
I am not yet done with this sort of situation, and shall have 
to come back to it presently. But even if such judgments as this 
can be dealt with in some such way, there is, it appears, a type 
of judgment where difficulties of a more obdurate kind are met 
with. The disagreement between Thales' judgment that the 
earth is flat and our judgment that the earth is round is due to 
an incompatibility of characters which, in judgment, we ascribe 
to an object assumed, in both cases, to exist. I am urging that 
such divergence as to the na.fore of an existing thing, when 
asserted in a judgment, does not differ in principle from the 
presence in perception of mutually divergent qualities. In 
neither case do we need any dimension of being other than the 
one real and existing world, holding perspectives, with a relational 
structure, in order to account for the divergence. Not yet are 
we sent to a self-contained realm of discourse, existenti~lly 
divorced from the real. But suppose the divergence between two 
judgments concerns not the what, but the that, not the nature 
of the predicate but the existence of the subject of the judgment. 
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Suppose I accuse some one of having stolen my automobile. 
Now, even if it be granted that the earth may truly be said to 
be both fl.at and spherical, dependent upon the available evi-
dence, the context, and wha.t earth one is talking about, surely 
here no such device will be of any help. Either the accused 
person did or he did not steal my automobile. If he did really 
steal it, it is sheer nonsense to say that there is any conceivable 
context or perspective in which he could truly be said not to 
have stolen it. Here the law of contradiction applies and applies 
inexorably. There can, it would seem, be nothing relational 
about such an assertion. It is either true or false, simply, intrin-
sically and absolutely. 
So that, even if we grant that judgments as to the characters 
which belong to existence, in so far as they all are based upon 
some evidence, are all in so far true, we are debarred from 
saying that contradictory judgments as to existence itself can 
both be true. Even if a coherence theory works in the first type 
of judgment, it breaks down in the second. In judgments of the 
first sort ( the earth is round) but a single quality is ascribed 
to an existing subject. The contexts and relations in which things 
stand are sufficiently complex and multiform to permit a variety 
of such simple predicates to be owned by an existing entity. 
But, a definite and more complex relation of characters is 
affirmed in judgments of the second sort, and then is ascribed 
to a specific instance of space-time. The area of existence-a 
single event-is more restricted while the characters ascribed 
to that event are more complex, so that there is no room in that 
limited area of existence for a different and contrary set of 
characters. The realm of characters overflows any possible con-
cretion in existence. A definite instance of existence, such as an 
event, has either to accept or reject the characters affirmed by 
the judgment. 
lVIr. Pepper spoke of a revolution taking place in recent and 
contemporary philosophy. Every important philosophical epoch 
likes to think of its own work as achieving something momen-
tous and revolutionary. Our own epoch may be significant. If 
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it is, and if Mr. Pepper is right, the contemporary overturning 
consists in a persistent refusal to accept as ontologically ulti-
mate the distinction between characters and their occurrence, 
and the correlative distinction between judgment or discourse 
and perception. I do not believe that the distinction can be 
obliterated, and replaced (as Mr. Pepper appears to wish) by 
the continuity and conjunctions of events, of movements, of 
experience. But I should like briefly to indicate how it seems to 
me that the absolute separation of these two realms can be at 
least mitigated. I agree that there is a genuine difference be-
tween the situations represented by these two types of judgment. 
But let us analyze the difference more closely. It lies, I think, 
in the different reg·ions of possible doubt and of certainty in the 
two cases. In the first instance, the two discrepant judgments 
about the earth agree that something, designated as the earth, 
exists. They differ as to its characters. That the earth exists 
is taken for granted by each judgment. There is room for doubt 
and fluctuation as to what the earth is, or is desCTibed as being, 
due to differences in the presented evidence. In the second case, 
on the other hand, the characters which the judgment affirms 
are determinate and fixed. We want here to know whether there 
existed or occurred an event, the stealing of my automobile, 
which is (for our purpose) adequately and completely charac-
terized by the terms of the judgment. When I judge '' this 
person stole my automobile,'' the judgment is true only if an 
event really occurred such as is described by the terms of the 
judgment. When I judge '' the earth is round,'' the judgment 
is true if an object, taken as existing, has, in a specific context, 
certain characters. In the first case the tlrnt is certain, the wlw.t 
is problematic; in the second case the wha.t is definite and abso_-
lute, the tha.t is more dubious. The copula has a different sense 
and function in the two cases. In the former ( the earth is 
round) it is the copula of description. In the latter, ( my auto-
mobile was stolen) it is the copula of position, of occurrence, 
of the presence in existence of a specified event. 
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I have spoken as if these were two kinds of judgment-
d,epending upon whether the existence ( or occurrence) of the 
subject, or the character of the predicate occupied the focus of 
attention, presented the question which the judgment resolves. 
I think there is some such distinction as this within types of 
judgment. But for our ·present purposes, I point out that tb,e 
distinction between perception and judgment is suggested here, 
rather than a distinction within the class of judgments alone. 
For, as ,ve descend the series of cognitive levels from a highly 
complex theory, through simpler judgments and hypotheses, 
down to perception and sensory awareness, we have a shifting 
and gradual alteration in the relative preponderance, the rela-
tive certainty and doubt of the two aspects which, since Bradley, 
we have come to designate as the that and the wha.t. At the lower 
levels of sensory awareness, that something is there, is, I feel 
confident, much more certain than wlwt that something is. And 
at the hig·her cognitive levels, where we are, seemingly, at great-
est remove from sensory awareness, in pure mathematics and 
logic, we know precisely wha.t we are dealing with, but whether 
or no it is exemplified in existence, is either relatively indifferent 
to us, or quite problematic so far as that level of judgment is 
concerned. For perception the that is certain, the what is 
dubious; for judgment the what is unambiguous, the tlwt is 
precarious. The nearer a judgment is to perception, the more 
uncertain or hidden is the what; the further from perception 
a judgment, the more unambiguous is the what and the more 
uncertain the that. 
If we push to its last limit this refusal to ascribe any what, 
any character at all to the object of perception (or of immediate 
experience) we go the way of the mystic. We affirm that no 
character which judgment ascribes to the that, is really owned 
by it. Or, we shall perhaps affirm that the characters which 
description, concepts, and judgments specify and articulate are 
relevant only to our needs and practical purposes. Both mysti-
cism and instrumentalism distort the true statement that the 
what furnished by perception is problematic into the false state-
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ment that perception ( or immediate experience) yields only a 
that, with the result that judgment and theory, science and 
philosophy, are barred from disclosing the nature of things. The 
articulation and relation between characters is the domina,nt 
aspect of judgment, but this concern with essences, '' concret-
ions in discourse,'' by no means necessarily precludes existence 
from being disclosed to, and directly apprehended by judgment. 
The psychological continuity between perception and judgment 
can hardly be questioned. Both are members of a single series 
of cognitive energies and functions. Sensory awareness, per-
ceptions, memory and imagery, ideas, hypotheses, scientific 
theories of all degree of elaboration and complexity, comprise 
a single continuum, so far as the life of the mind is concerned. 
Discrimination and analysis, comparison and ideal construction, 
recognition and interpretation, are present th~oughout in vary-
i~g combinations and proportions. Is this psychological and 
cognitive continuum broken and disrupted on the side of 
existence, of what is known as belonging to nature and reality, 
so that while independent existence is directly present in per-
ception, it is only indirectly and vicariously present (if at all) 
in imagination and memory, in judgment and theory, in the 
constructions of science and in discourse? 
Take the apparently simpler case of imagery. When I have 
a visual image of an absent physical object, the campanile, what 
is really and directly before my mind's eye? A mental dupli-
cate, impoverished and vague, comprised of a radically different 
kind of stuff from the real physical campanile made of steel and 
granite? Are there in this case two existentially separate cam-
paniles, one physical and the other mental? If this is affirmed, 
then I think we are inexorably driven to say that when I stand 
at the foot of the campanile and perceive- it there are likewise 
two existentially different campaniles, one mental and perceived, 
the other physical and not perceived, and all the old insuperable 
difficulties of a representative theory of perception are on our 
hands. All of the available psychological and physiological 
evidence points in the direction of a genuine continuity between 
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perception and imagination. Mr. Kemp Smith is wholly right in 
saying that '' no established psychological results stand in the 
way of our assuming that images are identical in character with 
sense-perceptions. " 1 Either then, the perceived campanile is 
wholly mental, or the imaged campanile is physical. The theory 
of representative perception is so demonstrably hopeless that 
we have to embark upon the second alternative, and go with it 
wherever it leads us. I suspect that its ultimate goal is not really 
a relational or cross-section or behaviorist theory of mind, but 
that is another story which must not be told now. But I am 
ready to say that what is called an image of the campanile is 
the one physical campanile as inia.ged. Ancl I shall go farther 
still. Just as perception and imagery belong to one continuum, 
so do imagery and memory. Memory is as direct as is perception. 
That is, just as an image of an absent object is the object as 
imaged, so a memory of a past real event is that event itself as 
1·e1nernbered. Memory is not, any more than perception and 
imagery, a trafficking with mental entities, existentially divorced 
from the real, occurring solely in a matrix ·yvhich is isolated from 
that which has existence. But the next-and last-step which I 
have to take will appear most hazardous and paradoxical. But I 
am driven irresistibly, it may seem, down a steep incline where 
disaster inevitably awaits me. What I have said of perception, 
of imagery, of memory, I now affirm of discourse and descrip-
tion. I perceive the campanile, I image it, I remember it, I 
describe it. My clescription may assume the form of history, of 
esthetic theory and appraisal, or of the physical stresses and 
strains which the structure, as an engineering product, must 
and does sustain. But no matter in what interest my description 
is conceived, a description of the campanile is again the real 
existing campanile a.s descri'.bed. Once more, here in the higher 
reaches of the cognitive series, far removed from momentary, 
sensuous perception, here in the domain of exact technical and 
engineering theory, or of esthetic judgment, or historical narra-
tive, you have not two existentially and radically separated 
1 Prolegomena to an Iiieali-st Theory of Knowleclge, 195. 
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realms; the campanile which is known in theory is even more 
the real campanile, than is the one perceived. The campanile 
as described is no more made of words and terms in discourse, 
than is the campanile which is imaged made of mental images, 
or the campanile which is perceived made of mental sensations. 
I neither image a campanile made of mind stuff, nor do I de-
scribe one which is compacted only of words and the letters of 
the alphabet. 
The little word "of" is likely to be treacherous. To say that 
I have a perception of a knife is only to say that I have the knife 
as perceived. I never get the knife at all save as either perceived 
or imaged or remembered, or as used in cutting, or enjoyed as a 
thing of beauty or described in words, or as known by physicist 
and chemist. If I have the right to say that I perceive, touch, 
and see an independently existing object-and unless I can say 
this there simply is not any problem of perception or knowledge 
at all-then I have the equal right to say that I image, remem-
ber, and describe an equally real and existing object. For, 
observe. Each of these various ways in which we get a knife, a 
penny, or anything whatever yields a unique perspective. Just 
as, at the level of sense perception, there are innumerable hoi·i-
zontal perspectives in which a penny may exist and be perceived 
as existing·, so the series of cognitive levels provides a series of 
verti:cal perspectives. There can be no essential difference in 
principle between the two different horizontal, perceptual per-
spectives in which the penny is now a circle and again an ellipse, 
and the two vertical perspectives in which the penny is now 
perceived and again described in terms of the formulae of the 
analytical chemist. As we ascend this vertical cognitive series 
from perception to scientific theory-or beyond-we enter into 
perspectives which are, intellectually, more satisfying because 
larger ranges of the things reality and nature are contained in 
them. . Thought and discourse, science and theory, instead of 
removing us from the real which is so fragmentarily and inade-
quately disclosed in immediate experience, penetrate more closely 
to things themselves. 
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But what is the real penny, the real knife, the real anything? 
The adjective "real" is a small, simple term of discourse. Noth-
ing is more insidiously easy and natural than to suppose that the 
things which are designated by simple and single terms are 
themselves simple and single. We tend all unconsciously to 
assume that because ''life,'' and ''mind,'' and ''soul,'' ''home,'' 
and ''thing'' are compact, discrete, one-syllable terms, that the 
entities for which these a.re terms in discourse must have the 
same simple and absolute characteristics. We fall foul here of 
the very notion of correspondence. Such terms as these are 
neither abstractions, nor essences, neither fia.fos vocis nor muscle 
twitches. They are, quite literally, the presence in discourse of 
complex relational structures. They are the focal points of per-
spectives which spread out and include vastly wider stretches 
of existence than those which figure in the perspectives of sen-
sory awareness and perception. Yet, in spite of this difference, 
almost quantitative, the relation between such a ter~ and the 
relational structure which is telescoped or which comes to a 
focus in that term, is not in principle different from the relation 
between a relatively simpler physical thing-a penny-and our 
perceptions of the penny. I suspect that one not inconsiderable 
motive which has led philosophers to the belief in discrete 
essences dwelling apart and floating, detached from that which 
has exist~nce, is the notion that that for which a term stands 
must have the simplicity, the discreteness, the self-contained-
ness, which characterizes the word as a term in discourse. 
The question recurs, what is the real penny? Which per-
ception of the penny delivers the real penny, and which descrip-
tion of the penny is the true description? When I try to be on 
my guard against the sort of fallacy which I have just indicated, 
and when I take such questions in all seriousness, I have to 
answer that I do not and never expect to know what the real 
penny is just because I can never hope to exhaust the infinite 
numbei, of perspectives in which things exist, are experienced, 
are described, and are thought of. And I do not think that you 
can urge, in reply, that at least I know some thin~s absolutely 
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and finally about the penny, i.e., I know it to be wholly false 
that a penny is an elephant .. Unless there is some evidence for 
this proposition, it simply is not a judgment at all. If there is 
evidence for it, that evidence will have to be conserved and 
adequately included in the final judgment, ideal and unattain-
able, as to the real nature of the penny. 
But we are here on the threshhold of a new and fresh inquiry. 
My chief concern hitherto has been to urge that there are no 
insuperable obstacles to the belief that independently existing 
things an~ structures directly appear not only in perception, 
but at every level of cognition in the ascending series from 
momentary sensory awareness, through images, memory, ideas, 
to the sustained processes of scientific and philosophical thought. 
It is this which marks my disagreement with the view pro-
pounded by Mr. Dennes (if I rightly understand him) that per-
ception alone supplies a breach in the domain of judgment, a 
loophole through which the real characters of things break 
through and are directly perceived for what they are, so that 
the truth of judgment consists in its fidelity to perception. What 
breaks through in perception is problematic, in need of incessant 
completion and revision. And not alone in such sporadic and 
vulnerable spots are the defenses of the domain of discourse 
broken through. The wall wears thin and threatens to crumble 
along the entire front from sensory awareness to thought and 
judgment. 
Yet, the impressive characteristic of perception is the con-
straint which comes from independently existing things. Such 
constraint appears to diminish as we go from perception to 
judgment, thought, and discourse. It seems to be replaced by 
an irresponsible freedom. Imagination and discourse seem to 
range at will, not tied down to anything which is given in 
sensory awareness. Of what sort is this freedom? Does it 
mean that the moment the constraint from the side of the given 
in sensation is relaxed, the instant that ideal construction comes 
upon the scene, there is no constraint of any sort at all? Such 
a supposition seems to me little short of monstrous. It would 
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render inexplicable every instance of inference, it would make 
invalid every departure from and ideal elaboration of a vanish-
ing immediate which could never be uttered; it would banish 
from science and thought every vestige of the effort to interpret 
the fragmentary clews which not only physical nature but all 
experience yield us. For nature yields nothing but faint and 
scattered clews. Everything given is problematic, not because 
nature as experienced and discoursed about is a shroud ·which 
conceals an unknowable-a substance I know not what-but 
because of the manifold wealth of pattern and structure, of con-
tent and perspective which her fragmentary hints disclose to the 
discerning and disciplined mind. 
In inference, interpretation, hypothesis, and theory, the mind 
is under the constraint of ideal elements and standards, no less 
than it is subject to the constraint of ''facts'' in perception. 
But no hard and fast line can be drawn at the I'.oint where 
constraint by facts ceases and constraint by ideal standards 
begins. Both types of constraint are operative throughout. 
There is inference and interpretation in perception, and there 
is something given in all hypothetical constructions of theory. 
What these constraining and ideal standards are cannot be 
ascertained by any easy and simple device. They are disclosed 
only in the actual structures of science and knowledge on the 
theoretical side, and likewise only in the fabric of concrete his-
torical achievement, on the practical side. 
In modern theories of truth which recognize any such con-
straining ideal standard, the ideal of coherence has received most 
attention and stress. And I am willing to say that the drift 
of my discussion is all in the direction of a coherence theory 
of truth. But I am under no illusion of having here adequately 
constructed such a theory or meeting the serious difficulties with · 
which such a theory has to contend. They appear to me fewer 
and less serious than those which stand in the way of any sort 
of correspondence theory. But I hope I have removed what 
has often appeared as the one great obstacle to a coherence 
theory. Our thoughts, judgment, and discourse, may be as 
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coherent as you please; what right does this give one to assert 
that the reality which is known by thought is correspondingly 
coherent 1 But this obstacle stands only upon the premises of a 
correspondence theory, of the belief that discourse and reality 
are two existentially different worlds, that discourse is an 
autonomous realm, fabricated within a matrix which is cut off 
from things. Once we recognize the possibility that discourse 
is indeed things discoursed about just as images are things 
imaged and perceptions are things perceived, this obstacle is 
overcome. Truth is, in all literalness, reality itself in the form 
and perspective of judgment. The immanent object, the. con-
tent, of a true judgment ·is the transcendent object itself in the 
one context in which it is most completely accessible to us. The 
discrepancy and conflict which is the source of error does not 
lie in the disagreement between the content of a judgment and 
a transcendent object, a disagreement which could never be 
known or judged. It has its source in the ever fruitful dis-
crepancy between ideal standards, perennially operative within 
experience, and the fragmentary data vouchsafed us by a world 
of which we know, indeed, so very little. But the proper expan-
sion of any such statement as this must be deferred to another 
occasion. 
